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I. INTRODUCTION
Through the relatively short jurisprudential history of the first
amendment establishment clause,1 the United States Supreme
1. The first amendment establishment clause reads: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. L Although the United
States Supreme Court had discussed the establishment clause several times before Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), made the clause applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, the first modem Supreme Court case interpreting the scope of the
establishment clause was Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For early interpreta-
tions of the clause, see Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); Bradfield v. Rob-
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Court has developed basic criteria to address establishment of reli-
gion questions. The Court set forth a three part test in Lemon v.
Kurtzman2 to determine whether a particular law or government
activity violates the establishment clause. The Lemon test evalu-
ates: (1) whether the challenged law or government activity has a
secular purpose; (2) whether the primary effect of the law or activ-
ity advances or inhibits religion; and (3) whether the law or activ-
ity creates excessive entanglement of government with religion.
Although the members of the Court have not always agreed on the
way that courts should apply these criteria,4 the Court consistently
has acknowledged the Lemon test as the foundation of establish-
ment clause analysis.5 This standard allows the Court to draw lines
to protect against the establishment dangers that the drafters of
the first amendment sought to prevent.8
Two recent Supreme Court decisions, however, cast doubt on
the continued vitality of the Lemon test as the basic establishment
clause line of inquiry. The first case, Marsh v. Chambers,7
presented the question of the constitutionality of state-funded leg-
islative prayer. The Court in Marsh neither applied nor addressed
the Lemon test, but rather upheld the practice primarily on the
erts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3. Id. at 612-13. Although the Court did not set forth definite criteria until Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (secular purpose and primary effect), and
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (excessive entanglement), the general con-
cerns that the Court addressed in these cases existed in earlier decisions as well. See McCol-
lum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
4. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 1567-68 (10th ed.
1980).
5. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,
459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Freedom v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 761, 772-73 (1973).
In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the Court applied a strict scrutiny equal
protection analysis to find that a state charitable solicitations statute, which granted clear
denominational preference in its exemptions, was unconstitutional. The Larson Court deter-
mined that the Lemon test did not apply to provisions discriminating among religions,
though the two tests address the same concerns. See id. at 251-52. Strict scrutiny generally
renders a law unconstitutional unless the government demonstrates a compelling state inter-
est and shows that the law is closely fitted to further that interest. See id. at 246-47;
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
116-17 (1943). For an in-depth treatment of equal protection strict scrutiny, see L. TRIBE,
AMERIcAN CONSTUTIONAL LAW 1000-02 (1978).
6. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
7. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
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basis of its long-standing historical importance." In the second
case, Lynch v. Donnelly,9 the challengers attacked the constitu-
tionality of a city-owned and -maintained Christmas nativity dis-
play. The Lynch Court applied the Lemon test, but relied heavily
upon the pervasiveness and historical significance of religious sym-
bols in society rather than upon a rigorous Lemon analysis. 10
This Recent Development argues that the Court's apparent
trend toward basing establishment clause analysis on the perva-
siveness or historical significance of government-supported reli-
gious activities represents an undesirable move away from strict
examination of the questionable law or activity under the Lemon
test. Part II briefly examines the theoretical bases of the establish-
ment clause, then traces the Court's applications of each element
of the Lemon analysis. Part III discusses the Marsh and Lynch
decisions as the most recent Supreme Court additions to establish-
ment clause doctrine. Finally, part IV analyzes two major effects of
these decisions: first, the emergence of the historical approach as a
significant, though not always appropriate, tool for establishment
clause inquiry; and second, the Court's partial abrogation of the
Lemon test as the settled and rigorous examination of most estab-
lishment of religion questions. Part IV concludes that the Court
should synthesize its two approaches in order to ensure consistency
in establishment clause decisions and adequately protect first
amendment values.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Establishment Clause Theory
The Supreme Court often has cited Thomas Jefferson's con-
cept of a "wall of separation"11 between church and state to de-
scribe the constitutional limitations on relations between religion
and civil government.' 2 This characterization, however, has been
only a metaphor and not a standard that the Court actually has
applied.13 The so-called "high and impregnable" wall of separa-
8. Id. at 3333-35.
9. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
10. Id. at 1360-61, 1365-66.
11. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), re-
printed in 8 THE WRrrINGS oF THoMAs JEFFERSON 113 (Washington ed. 1861).
12. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1982); Wohnan v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
13. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. at 122-23; Giannella, Lemon and Til-
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tion is a theory of strict government neutrality toward religion
which the Court often has advocated,15 but never adopted. The
Court has avoided a strict interpretation of the establishment
clause primarily in recognition of the competing values in the free
exercise and establishment clauses, 6 and out of a desire not to
deny religion and religious activities the benefits that properly flow
from the state to the public.1 7 Thus, establishment clause jurispru-
ton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entanglement, 1971 SUP. CT. Rav. 147, 151;
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1416 (1981). For a
discussion of the vitality of the wall as a concept of separation of church and state, compare
Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AN STATE 17 (D. Oaks
ed. 1963), with Fey, An Argument for Separation, id. at 26. The solidity of the wall as an
absolute barrier to government involvement in religion never has been certain. In Everson
Justice Black wrote for the Court: "The First Amendment has erected a wall between
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach." 330 U.S. at 18. Having set that strict standard, the Everson Court then
upheld a state program to pay transportation expenses for students of parochial as well as
public schools. Justice Jackson dissented: "[T]he undertones of the opinion.., seem ut-
terly discordant with its conclusion .... [T]he most fitting precedent is that of Julia who,
according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er consent,"-consented.'" Id. at 19
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
14. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
15. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 319 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); Note,
Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause, 81 COLUm. L. Rsv. 1463, 1463 (1981).
16. The first amendment free exercise clause reads: "Congress shall make no law...
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The tension between
the establishment and free exercise clauses is a fundamental, and perhaps innate, first
amendment problem. Many activities that the government designs to protect the free exer-
cise of religion-tax benefits and zoning privileges, for example-may threaten to establish
certain religions as state-sanctioned. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 1546-47; see also
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677
(1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-70 (1970); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
409 (1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
The relationship between the free exercise and establishment clauses and the issue
whether one or the other should predominate have been the subject of much debate. Com-
pare L. TamE, supra note 5, at 827-28 (advocating expansive reading of the free exercise
clause, less expansive reading of the establishment clause) with Note, supra note 15, at 1476
(advocating strong interpretation of the establishment clause) and Choper, Defining "Reli-
gion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (advocating equal reading of both
clauses because of the independent values and emphasis of each clause). For a discussion of
the free exercise neutrality theory of establishment clause interpretation, see Giannella, Re-
ligious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II, The Nonestablish-
ment Principle, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 513, 518-21 (1968).
This Recent Development addresses only the Court's recent treatment of the establish-
ment clause. Although free exercise is a vital aspect of first amendment protection of reli-
gious liberty, Marsh and Lynch raise no free exercise issues requiring extensive treatment
here.
17. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983) (allowing tuition tax deductions
for dependents' education); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding federal
1178
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dence has not lent itself to absolutes or mechanical solutions,1 but
rather has been a continuing debate over the government's proper
"neutral" stance in activities affecting religion or religious
institutions.19
This debate has not yielded a clear definition of the purpose of
the establishment clause. Although the general concern underlying
the principle of the separation of church and state is clear-"union
of government and religion tends to destroy government and de-
grade religion" 20-the Court has had difficulty developing a more
specific statement of policy. Even resort to the writings of the
Framers has not produced consistent interpretations. The Court
has stated that for the Framers the establishment of religion con-
noted "sponsorship, financial support, and active involement of the
sovereign in religious activity.""1 More recently, however, the
Court set forth a narrower purpose: "to foreclose the establishment
of a state religion familiar in other Eighteenth Century systems."2
The scope of the establishment clause has taken shape largely
through a case-by-case evaluation of the establishment dangers
that different fact situations present." This approach has not pro-
duced great theoretical consistency and has led to criticism that
the Court's definitional efforts and line drawing lack a lasting fun-
damental character. Despite theoretical and doctrinal difficulties,
construction grants to colleges and universities); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968) (denying challenge to textbook loans to students); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (allowing school bus transportation). For a discussion of the political neutral-
ity theory of establishment clause interpretation, see Giannella, supra note 16, at 519-21.
18. The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), stated that "[c]andor com-
pels acknowledgement... that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this
extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." Id. at 612. One commentator added,
"anyone suggesting that the answer, as a matter of constitutional law, is clear one way or the
other is either deluding or deluded. The seeming simplicity of the 'absolutist' construction
of the first amendment is only too patently disingenuous. . . ." P. KURLAND, RELIION AND
THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT 111 (1962).
19. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Freedom v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
788 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668-70 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
20. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
21. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
22. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122 (1982).
23. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
24. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265-66 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting); Buchanan, Accommodation of Religion in the Public Schools: A Plea for Care-
ful Balancing of Competing Constitutional Values, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 1000, 1021 (1981);
Curry, James Madison and the Burger Court: Converging Views of Church-State Separa-
1984] 1179
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however, since Lemon v. Kurtzman2 5 the Court consistently has
asked the same three basic questions to determine whether a par-
ticular law or government activity violated the establishment
clause:26 (1) whether the challenged law or government activity has
a secular purpose; (2) whether the primary effect of the law or ac-
tivity advances or inhibits religion; and (3) whether the law or ac-
tivity creates excessive entanglement of government with religion.2
B. The Lemon Criteria
1. Secular Purpose
The secular purpose test, arguably the criterion that goes di-
rectly to the heart of establishment clause objectives, 28 has been
relatively simple for the Court to apply. This element alone will
strike down a challenged law or government activity if wholly or
plainly religious considerations clearly motivated the activity.2 In
Engel v. Vitale,30 the landmark school prayer case, the Court con-
cluded that the nature of prayer was clearly religious and that a
law requiring or permitting use of a state-composed prayer" in a
public schoolroom was part of an unconstitutional government pro-
gram designed to further religious beliefs.32 In Epperson v. Arkan-
sas"3 the Court held that a law prohibiting public school teachers
from teaching an evolutionary theory of man's origin also had a
clearly religious purpose.3 4 The Court concluded that the state's
objective was to prevent discussion contrary to traditional biblical
doctrine according to Genesis.3 5 More recently, in Stone v. Gra-
tion, 56 IND. L.J. 615, 615 (1981); Marty, Of Darters and Schools and Clergymen: The Reli-
gion Clauses Worse Confounded, 1978 Sup. CT. Rxv. 171, 182.
25. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
26. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 4, at 1567-68.
27. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
28. See L. TRnE, supra note 5, at 835. "The most fundamental requirement in a con-
stitutional system designed to secure religious autonomy is that governmental action at least
be justifiable in secular terms." Id.
29. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1362 (1984).
30. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
31. The prayer recommended by the New York Board of Regents read: "'Almighty
God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our
parents, our teachers and our country."' Id. at 422.
32. See id. at 424-25; see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(mandatory daily Bible readings in public school classrooms are unconstitutional).
33. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
34. The Arkansas anti-evolution statute prohibited teachers in any state-supported
school from teaching or using a textbook advocating the theory" 'that mankind ascended or
descended from a lower order of animals."' Id. at 99.
35. See id. at 107.
1180 [Vol. 37:1175
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ham,s6 the Court looked beyond the avowed secular purpose of a
state requirement that public schools post the Ten Command-
ments in classrooms 37 to the plainly religious purpose of the
statute.38
If the Court concludes that the purpose of a law or activity is
less than wholly or plainly religious, even where some benefit to
religion is obvious or substantial, the law or activity will satisfy the
secular purpose requirement. For example, in Everson v. Board of
Education,9 the Court considered whether a local government
constitutionally could provide transportation for students attend-
ing parochial as well as public schools. The Court held that the
state, as part of a general program, could pay the transportation
expenses of parochial school students,'4 0 because of the public in-
terest in maintaining programs of general welfare and benefit,
1
and because the statute had a permissible public purpose. 2 Simi-
larly, in Board of Education v. Allen 4 the Court upheld a state
statute requiring local public school authorities to lend textbooks
without charge to all students, including students attending paro-
chial school." According to the Court, religious schools pursue two
goals-religious instruction and secular education-and the state
may have a proper interest in supporting secular education."5
Simply because a government agency singles out specific reli-
gious organizations for benefits does not mean that the agency is
acting unconstitutionally. In Walz v. Tax Commission" the Court
36. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
37. The statute declared a secular purpose and required that each posted copy of the
Ten Commandments contain a notation in small print explaining the significance of the
document as the "'fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of
the United States."' Id. at 41.
38. Id. The Court concluded that the Ten Commandments are "undeniably a sacred
text" to Judeo-Christian religions, that the Commandments pertain to matters beyond ar-
guably secular concerns, and that the Commandments serve no integrated educational func-
tion in the classroom. Id. at 41-42; see also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (finding no secular purpose for requiring daily Bible readings in public school
classrooms).
39. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
40. See id. at 17-18.
41. See id. at 6, 17-18.
42. The Court focused the public purpose discussion on the due process issue, see id.
at 6, but this concern was apparent in the establishment clause portion of the decision as
well, see id. at 18.
43. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
44. See id. at 247-48.
45. See id. at 245-47.
46. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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considered the constitutionality of tax exemptions for properties
that religious groups used solely for worship. 7 Although the reli-
gious benefits of the activity were obvious and substantial, the
Court concluded that the legislative purpose of the grants was not
to advance religion because the state properly could consider reli-
gious groups a beneficial and stabilizing influence in community
life. The state, therefore, could award the tax exemptions in the
public interest.48 Similarly, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,49 in
which the state gave churches veto power over the issuance of li-
quor licenses within a certain radius of church property, 50 the
Court held that the statute embraced valid secular legislative pur-
poses. 1 Thus, although the Court has struck down government ac-
tivities that lack any valid secular purpose, this part of the Lemon
test is relatively easy to pass. The Court generally is reluctant to
attribute unconstitutional motives to a state, particularly if the
Court can derive a plausible secular purpose from the face of the
challenged statute.2
2. Primary Secular Effect
The primary effect test has proved analytically more difficult
for the Court to apply than the secular purpose criterion, because
in every case raising an establishment clause question the chal-
lenged law or government activity undeniably provides some bene-
fit or hindrance to religion. The problem for the Court is deciding
and defining how much benefit or hindrance constitutes a primary
effect, because "[t]he test is inescapably one of degree." 53
The cases provide no certain definitional guidelines. In McCol-
lum v. Board of Education4 the state permitted various religious
47. The individual who challenged the tax exemptions contended that the grant indi-
rectly required him to contribute to religious organizations. Id. at 667.
48. Id. at 672-73.
49. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
50. The Massachusetts statute provided that the governing body of a church or school
could prevent the liquor license commission from granting a license to any establishment
located within a 500-foot radius of the church or school See id. at 117.
51. Id. at 123. The federal district court described the purpose of the challenged stat-
ute as "protecting spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'hurly-burly' associ-
ated with liquor outlets." Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 495 F. Supp. 761, 766 (D. Mass.
1980). The Supreme Court accepted the district court's interpretation, but went on to find
that the state could accomplish the purpose of the statute through other means, such as an
absolute ban on licenses or a guaranteed hearing. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. at 123-24.
52. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983).
53. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
54. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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groups to send teachers into public schoolrooms to provide reli-
gious instruction during the school day." The Court concluded
that the activity was unconstitutional because the state aided sec-
tarian groups by providing pupils for religious classes through the
state's compulsory attendance laws.5  In Engel v. Vitale57 the
Court declared that a state school prayer program was unconstitu-
tional because it effectively placed the government's "power,
prestige and financial support. . . behind a particular religious be-
lief."59 Similarly, in Abington School District v. Schempp,6° the
Court found unconstitutional mandatory daily Bible readings in
public schools because the practice clearly and impermissibly aided
religion.61 Finally, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,e2 a case in
which a state statute conferred on churches a veto power over i-
quor licenses, the Court stated that "the mere appearance of a
joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State pro-
vide[d] a significant [and unconstitutional] symbolic benefit to
religion."6
In contrast to the Court's invalidation of laws and government
activities that may provide a direct benefit to religion, the Court
has refused to strike down other laws and activities whose benefit
to religion the Court has described as attenuated" or indirect, re-
mote, or incidental.6 5 For example, the Court has upheld provision
of transportation" and textbooks 67 laws for students attending sec-
tarian schools; federal construction grants to church-sponsored col-
55. In McCollum certain members of the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and several Protes-
tant faiths arranged through the local board of education to provide religious classes for
public school students in regular classrooms during the school day. Attendance was volun-
tary, but students released from their classes had to attend the religious instruction. See id.
at 207-09.
56. Id. at 212. Cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a "released-time"
program for students to receive religious instruction off school grounds).
57. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
58. The New York State Legislature granted the State Board of Regents broad powers
over the state public school system. The Board of Regents recommended a daily prayer
procedure, which a local board of education adopted as a classroom requirement for each
school day. Id. at 422-23. The prayer appears at supra note 31.
59. Id. at 431.
60. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
61. Id. at 225; see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968).
62. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
63. Id. at 125-26.
64. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3069 (1983).
65. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973).
66. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
67. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
1984] 1183
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leges providing both secular and religious instruction; 8 church
property tax exemptions;6 and Sunday closing laws.70 In these
cases, the Court concluded that the benefits to religion did not
amount to a primary effect of aiding religion, even though the
Court observed that state-subsidized bus fares undoubtedly help
children get to church schools;"' that "free books make it more
likely that some children [will] choose to attend a sectarian
school; '7 2 that construction grants aid sectarian colleges;73 that
granting church property tax exemptions necessarily confers an
economic benefit;74 and that the Sunday closing laws undeniably
increase respect for and attendance at religious institutions. 5
Clearly, the Court has employed a balancing process to determine
whether a law or activity primarily benefits religion. Although this
approach necessitates a subjective weighing of the various per-
ceived impacts on religion, the Court has maintained a rigorous ap-
plication of the effect standard, even in instances in which the
Court ultimately found no impermissible effect.
3. Excessive Entanglement
The secular purpose and primary secular effect requirements
of the Lemon test have roots in Supreme Court decisions preceding
Lemon.76 Similarly, one year before Lemon, in Walz v. Tax Com-
mission,7 7 the Court added a third element to the establishment
clause analysis-the requirement that the challenged law or activ-
ity must not create "excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.178 This third criterion consists of two related strands.79 First,
68. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
69. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
70. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
71. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
72. Allen, 392 U.S. at 244.
73. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679.
74. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
75. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 679.
76. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1968); Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 266 (1963).
77. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
78. Id. at 674. For arguments for and against including the entanglement criterion,
compare Curry, supra note 24, at 635-36 (the entanglement test is helpful and "echoes
Madison's concern about religious factions") with Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the
Religion Clauses-A Ten-Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1195, 1216-17 (1980) (the
entanglement test "invites a whole new degree of subjectivity and thus represents... the
ultimate defeat of attempts to use neutral principles to interpret the religion clauses").




the Walz Court declared that the establishment clause prohibits
excessive continuing administrative entanglements between the
government and religious organizations.80 Second, the Court devel-
oped a political divisiveness strands' to prevent political division
along religious lines.82
(a) Administrative Entanglement
In deciding whether the challenged government relationship
with religion creates excessive administrative entanglement, the
Court has had to undertake detailed factual inquiries." In Lemon
v. Kurtzman8 4 the Court first outlined the administrative entangle-
ment question: courts must examine the character and purposes of
the benefited institutions, the nature of the government aid, and
the resulting relationship between government and the religious
authority.8 5 The Lemon Court held that a statute providing salary
supplements to nonpublic school teachers violated the establish-
ment clause because it created administrative entanglements. 8
The Court reasoned that the supplemental salary program would
require "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state sur-
veillance. ' '87 Similarly, the Court has held that when the state pro-
vides certain materials and services to nonpublic schools, the state
creates excessive administrative entanglement to ensure that
schools adhere to state restrictions." Recently, in Larkin v. Gren-
del's Den, Inc.,"9 the Court concluded that the churches' veto
power over neighborhood liquor licenses constituted "a fusion of
80. Walz, 397 U.S. at 675.
81. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Committee for Pub. Educ.
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 622 (1971).
82. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
83. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (evaluating textbooks, testing,
diagnostic, therapeutic and remedial services, instructional equipment, and field trip trans-
portation); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (evaluating construction grants).
84. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
85. See id. at 615.
86. The Lemon Court also found that the statutes at issue had a secular purpose, but
the Court did not address the secular effect question because the Court felt that the exces-
sive entanglement analysis was dispositive. See id. at 613-14.
87. Id. at 619.
88. See Wolnan v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975). In Wolman and Meek the states of Ohio and Pennsylvania sought to provide non-
public schools with textbooks, auxiliary services such as therapy and remedial aid, and in-
structional materials. See Wolman, 433 U.S. at 250, 254; Meek, 421 U.S. at 372.
89. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
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governmental and religious functions," 90 and violated the principle
of preventing religious or government institutions from intruding
upon the other's territory.9 1
The Supreme Court has recognized that some administrative
entanglement is inevitable when otherwise valid laws or govern-
ment activities affect religion. 2 For example, the Court has upheld
lump sum federal construction grants to church-related colleges,
e
9
and government provision of therapeutic and remedial services to
nonpublic school students. The Court has concluded that these
services were sufficiently separable from the sectarian education
process that they did not cause excessive entanglement.9 4 In addi-
tion, the Court has allowed state parental income tax deductions
for elementary and secondary school education expenses,9 holding
that the state's determination whether to allow deductions for sec-
tarian school expenses did not constitute excessive entanglement.eY
90. Id. 126 (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
91. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
92. See Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. at 123; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 614; Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
93. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971). The Court reasoned that
the grants raised no impermissible entanglement problems because of the "nonideological
character" of the aid and because the one-time, single-purpose payments created no need
for a substantial continuing relationship between the religious and government institutions.
Id. at 687-88. The Court also emphasized the significant differences in the religious charac-
ter of church-related higher education on one hand, and elementary and secondary school
education on the other, especially in the students' "susceptib[ility] to religious indoctrina-
tion." Id. at 686; see also Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. RaV. 1680,
1691 (1969). Similarly, in Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), the Court asserted
that no administrative entanglement occurred because adult legislators are not subject to
indoctrination or coercion by legislative prayer sessions. Id. at 3335. For a discussion of
Marsh, see infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
94. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977). The Wolman Court distinguished
therapeutic and remedial services from the act of supplying instructional materials and
equipment, the functions of which the state cannot separate into sectarian and nonsectarian
elements. See id. at 250.
95. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3064-65 (1983). The Minnesota statute in
question allowed taxpayers to deduct a wide range of expenses that they incurred for their
children's education, including tuition, fees, textbooks, and transportation to and from pub-
lic or private school. Approximately 10% of all Minnesota students attended private
schools, and well over 90% of that number attended sectarian schools. See id. at 3072 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 3071. The Court reasoned that the discretionary decisions that the state
would have to make were not significantly different from the decisions that the Court al-
lowed the state to make in Woman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421




The notion of political divisiveness presents the converse en-
tanglement danger, focusing on political division along religious
lines, and reflects a fear of church intrusion into secular politics.9 7
The political divisiveness strand of the entanglement test may not
be an independent ground for finding an establishment clause vio-
lation,98 but this strand has figured prominently in several Su-
preme Court opinions. In Lemon v. Kurtzman" the Court ob-
served that only a few religious groups would benefit from public
salary support for nonpublic school teachers, but the Court ex-
pressed concern about the potential pressures that other religious
groups might exert to increase their own aid. The Court also noted
the dangers of heightened religious partisanship beyond the ordi-
nary political debate inherent in a democratic system.100 In Com-
mittee for Public Education and Religious Freedom v. Nyquist'10
the Court maintained that because of the importance of the com-
peting social interests concerned,102 the state's financial aid pro-
gram for nonpublic schools "carrie[d] grave potential for entangle-
ment [through] continuing political strife over aid to religion."10 3
Finally, in Grendel's Den the Court concluded that a statute
granting churches veto power over liquor licenses essentially sub-
stituted the discretion of a religious group for the reasoned judg-
ment of a legislative body on "issues with significant economic and
political implications."10' 4
m. RECFNT DEVELOPmENTS
In Marsh v. Chambers05 and Lynch v. Donnelly08 the Court
developed a new approach to evaluating establishment clause is-
sues that departs from the settled Lemon analysis. The new in-
quiry focuses on the asserted traditional or historical significance
of the challenged state activity. This approach allows the Court to
evaluate establishment clause issues on the basis of the Court's
97. See L. Tamz, supra note 5, at 866.
98. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
797-98 (1973), cited with approval in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364 (1984).
99. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
100. See id. at 622-23; see also Freund, supra note 93, at 1692.
101. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
102. Id. at 794.
103. Id.; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975).
104. 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982).
105. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
106. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
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own interpretation of history and references to the presence of reli-
gious elements in public life.
A. Marsh v. Chambers
In Marsh the Court addressed the constitutionality of having
a state-paid chaplain deliver prayers to open each session of a state
legislature. A member of the legislature, a taxpayer, challenged
both the prayer practice and the sixteen year tenure of the Presby-
terian minister.107 The Court0 8 completely ignored the Lemon
test 0 9 and instead focused primarily on the historical significance
of legislative prayer. The Court stated that "[t]he opening of ses-
sions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer
is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country.
110
As in Walz v. Tax Commission,""' the Court qualified its approach
by maintaining that historical patterns standing alone do not jus-
tify contemporary constitutional violations,1 but the Court added
that such an "unbroken practice" 13 of legislative prayer deserves
significant weight. The unique history of opening legislative assem-
blies with prayers, and the apparent acceptance of legislative
prayer by the drafters of the first amendment, led the Court to
conclude that the practice posed no real threat to establishment
clause values.1
107. The challenger brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), seeking to enjoin
the practice as a violation of the establishment clause. The same Presbyterian minister had
served as salaried chaplain to the Nebraska legislature for 16 years. The legislature also
periodically published the chaplain's prayers at public expense. The federal district court
enjoined the publication of the prayers and the court of appeals affirmed. See Marsh v.
Chambers, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court considered only the issue
whether the first amendment prohibits a state-employed chaplain from opening legislative
sessions with prayer. See Marsh, 203 S. Ct. at 3332.
108. Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices White, Black-
mun, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined.
109. The court of appeals applied the Lemon test and concluded that the chaplaincy
practice violated all three parts: the purpose and primary effect of the prayer was to pro-
mote a particular religious viewpoint, and the use of state funds constituted entanglement.
See Marsh, 675 F.2d at 234-35.
110. Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3332-33. The Court noted that a religious invocation pre-
cedes sessions of the Supreme Court and other courts: "God save the United States and this
Honorable Court." The Court also recognized the early history of congressional chaplains,
whom the Framers appointed at nearly the same time that they reached agreement on the
language of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 3333.
111. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
112. Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3334.
113. See id. at 3334-45 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)).
114. See id.
1188
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Justice Brennan, in a lengthy dissent,115 protested even a lim-
ited abrogation of the Lemon analysis. He reasoned that the deci-
sion "confirms that the Court is carving out an exception to the
Establishment Clause rather than reshaping Establishment Clause
doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer." 1n Justice Brennan
maintained that if the Court had judged the issue "through the
unsentimental eye of our settled doctrine,"117 the Court would
have found legislative prayer unconstitutional. Applying the
Lemon criteria, he concluded that the legislative prayer in question
had a religious purpose, a religious effect, and that it led to exces-
sive entanglement between the government and religion.18 In ad-
dition, Justice Brennan believed that legislative prayer would fail
the Larson strict scrutiny test,11' as well as the test that he first set
forth in Schempp.
12 0
Justice Brennan did not reject completely the historical and
philosophical reasoning underlying the majority opinion.12 1 He ar-
gued, however, that the Court's reasoning gave a static and lifeless
115. Justice Brennan acknowledged that his dissent directly contradicted language in
the opinion he wrote 20 years earlier in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
299-300 (Brennan, J., concurring), in which he suggested that legislative prayer may present
no establishment clause problem. See Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3337 & n.2 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
116. Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3338 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. Justice Brennan concluded that the Nebraska legislature's prayer violated all
three parts of the Lemon test: the religious purpose of the prayer was self-evident; the prac-
tice created indirect religious coercion and placed the state's imprimatur of approval on the
prayer; and the prayer was evidence of administrative entanglement and potential, if not
actual, political divisiveness over the issue. See id. at 3338-39.
119. See supra note 5.
120. Justice Brennan often has advocated his own establishment clause test, which the
Court never has adopted:
What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under the Establishment
Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of religious with secular institutions
which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ
the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially reli-
gious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also
Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3340 n.11 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 770-71 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734,
750 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 643 (1971) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680-81 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
121. Brennan stated that "[t]he path of formal doctrine ... can only imperfectly cap-
ture the nature and importance of the issues at stake in this case. A more adequate analysis
must therefore take into account the underlying function of the Establishment Clause, and
the forces that have shaped its doctrine." Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3341 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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meaning to the Framers' work. To be truly faithful to the Framers,
Brennan argued, the Court should have limited its use of history to
broad purposes, not specific practices.1 2  Justice Brennan main-
tained that a modern interpretation of the purpose of the estab-
lishment clause must take into account the diverse religious com-
position of modern society.123  He believed that the Court's
historical approach failed to consider changes in religion since the
time that the Framers wrote the establishment clause.
B. Lynch v. Donnelly
In Lynch124 the Court more fully developed the new establish-
ment clause analysis that it apparently introduced in Marsh. The
Lynch Court addressed the question whether a city constitution-
ally could include a nativity scene, or creche, in its downtown
Christmas display.1 2' The federal district court, applying the
Lemon test,2 6 and the court'of appeals, applying the Larson strict
scrutiny test,1 27 both concluded that the city's actions violated the
establishment clause.128 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that,
"notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche," the city
did not violate the establishment clause. 29
122. Id. at 3348 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963)).
123. See Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3348 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan pointed
to other cases in which the Court has avoided an approach that permanently determines the
meaning of a constitutional right according to practices existing at the time of its enact-
ment. See id. & n.35 (citing Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (right to a jury trial));
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (sex discrimination); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (search and seizure); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (cruel and un-
usual punishment); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race discrimination).
124. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
125. The city of Pawtucket, R.I. owned a Christmas display, including a nativity
scene, which the city erected each year prominently in the main shopping district. The dis-
play consisted of various figures and decorations that one traditionally associates with the
Christmas season, as well as the nativity scene. See id. at 1256.
126. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1168 (DR.L 1981).
127. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d. 1029, 1034 (1st Cir. 1982).
128. The district court held that the purpose of including the creche in the display
was to endorse and promulgate certain religious beliefs and that the effect was to "affiiat[e]
the City with the Christian beliefs that the creche represents." Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F.
Supp. at 1177. The Court further held that, although including the crache created no ad-
ministrative entanglements, the practice posed a danger of political divisiveness and thus
threatened excessive entanglement. See id. at 1179-80. The First Circuit determined that
the display of the crache was unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny analysis that the
Supreme Court adopted in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). The First Circuit held
that Larson prohibited laws discriminating among religions. See supra note 5.
129. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366.
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The analytical basis for the Court's decision is not entirely
clear. The majority opinion 30 began with an essentially historical
approach, maintaining that the Court's interpretations of the es-
tablishment clause have comported with the contemporaneous un-
derstanding of the rights that the clause guarantees."" The Court
then recognized the importance of religion in American life.132 Un-
like in Marsh,1 3 3 however, the Court did not rely on an exclusively
historical analysis, but rather used history ostensibly to reject a
rigid absolutist approach to questions of government relations with
religion.134 The Court's introductory history lesson diminished the
independent significance of the Lemon analysis that followed.
The Court applied the Lemon test, not as a fixed approach,
but as a useful inquiry in the line drawing process that is necessary
in establishment cases.13 5 The Court concluded with little difficulty
that the city's activity had a secular purpose. The Court reasoned
that, because the inclusion of the creche was not "motivated whol-
ly by religious considerations," 36 and because the Court found no
"purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle
governmental advocacy of a particular religious message, '' -37 the
display of the creche suggested no impermissible purpose on the
part of the city.138
The Court also concluded that the primary effect of including
the creche in the display was not to advance or endorse religion in
violation of the establishment clause.139 The Court did not examine
the actual effect of the creche, but stated merely that any benefit
to religion was indirect, remote, and incidental. The Court was un-
able to discern a greater aid to religion in this case than in any
130. Chief Justice Burger, who authored the Marsh opinion, also wrote the majority
opinion in Lynch, in which Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined.
131. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359.
132. Id. at 1360-61. To bolster its assertion of an unbroken history of official acknowl-
edgement of religion, the Court cited examples such as the national holidays of
Thanksgiving and Christmas, military and legislative chaplains, the national motto "In God
We Trust," religious paintings in art galleries, and prayer chapels in the Capitol building.
See id.
133. The Marsh Court did not address the Lemon test, even following its historical
analysis. See supra text accompanying note 109.
134. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359-62.
135. The Court stated: "[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." Id. at 1362 (citations omitted).
136. Id.





other case in which the Court had permitted religious activity.10
Finally, the entanglement questions posed little difficulty for
the majority.14 1 The Court adopted the court of appeals' observa-
tion14 2 that political divisiveness alone has never been sufficient to
invalidate otherwise permissible conduct.' 43 The Court rejected the
argument that the simple fact that the present controversy was in
litigation illustrated the conflict resulting from including a creche
in a public display.14 4 The majority felt that the creche engendered
a friendly community spirit, 145 noting the district court's finding
that the Christmas display had a calm history behind it, with no
evidence of apparent conflict.
14
1
Beyond the application of the Lemon criteria, the Court felt
offended by the suggestion that the presence of a nativity scene in
a large seasonal holiday display could violate the constitutional
prohibition against the establishment of religion. The Court re-
fused to impose a "crabbed reading"' 47 of the establishment clause
to the detriment of the country's religious heritage, 48 while people
celebrate the same holiday in other public places with religious
hymns, the national motto proclaims "In God We Trust," religious
paintings hang in public art galleries, and legislatures open their
sessions with prayers by salaried chaplains. 49 The majority also
maintained that "[a]ny notion that these symbols pose a real dan-
140. See id. For the Court to hold that the creche failed the primary effect test, the
Court felt that it would have to conclude that the nativity scene advanced religion more
than textbooks and transportation for parochial students, federal building grants to church-
related colleges, religious property tax exemptions, Sunday closing laws, and legislative
prayer. According to the Court, the creche did not benefit religion as much as these other
activities. Id. at 1363-64. The Court then distinguished Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116 (1983), and McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), as cases in which the
activity substantially benefited religion. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
141. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
142. Id.
143. In addition, the Court stated that, because Lynch did not involve a direct subsidy
to church-sponsored schools, colleges, or other religious institutions, the Court did not have
to address the political divisiveness issue. Id. (citing Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071
n.11 (1983)).
144. The Court asserted: "Curiously, [the district court held] that the political divi-
siveness engendered by this lawsuit was evidence of excessive entanglements. A litigant can-
not, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit, however, create the appearance of divisiveness
and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1366.




ger of establishment of a state church is far-fetched indeed," 150 be-
cause the fears and political problems that originally spawned the
religion clauses are of far less concern today.' 51 Thus, the Court
echoed the tone of its approach in Marsh by harking back to the
Framers' day for guidance, and by emphasizing the pervasiveness
of religion and religious symbols.
To Justice Brennan, writing for the four dissenting justices,
the display of the creche was clearly unconstitutional. Unlike the
majority, the dissent did not focus on the history or the setting of
the creche, but rather on the Lemon test. The dissenters found
that the city's activity violated all three criteria of the test. First,
the dissent reasoned that the distinctively religious nature of the
creche and the implied goal of "keep[ing] 'Christ in Christmas' ,,3.5
demonstrated a sectarian purpose.'"" Second, the dissent found
that the creche gave the appearance that the government put its
prestige and public recognition behind the beliefs that people asso-
ciate with the nativity scene,154 thus providing "a significant sym-
bolic benefit to religion."'5 5 Last, the dissenters believed that the
strong possibility of future administrative entanglements, and the
apparent beginning of a political controversy over the issue within
the city posed a significant threat of excessive entanglement be-
tween government and religion.'5 6
The dissent sharply criticized what it perceived as the two
principal theories that the majority used to pass the cr6che
through the Lemon test. The dissent maintained that the Court
focused on the public recognition of the holiday and the secular
nature of other parts of the display instead of acknowledging the
150. Id. at 1366.
151. Id. at 1365 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947)). The Court
elaborated: "We are unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Vicar of Rome, or
other powerful religious leaders behind every public acknowledgement of the religious heri-
tage long officially recognized by the three constitutional branches of government." Lynch,
104 S. Ct. at 1365-66.
152. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1373 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Donnelly v. Lynch,
525 F. Supp. 1150, 1173 (D.R.I. 1981)).
153. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1373 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also ques-
tioned why the Court did not inquire whether the city had other means available to achieve
its secular objectives, as the Court did in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 510
(1983). See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1372 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority considered
this question irrelevant. See id. at 1363 n.7.
154. The dissent stated: "The nativity scene is ... the chief symbol of [a] characteris-
tically Christian belief .... For Christians, that path is exclusive, precious and holy."
Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1373 (quoting Grendel's Den, 103 S. Ct. at 511).
156. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1373-74.
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clearly religious significance of the nativity scene.157 The dissent
argued that the secular setting was irrelevant. Although the official
public holiday at Christmas is a traditional and arguably accept-
able event, active government participation in the holiday is not
acceptable. 158 The dissenters argued that funding and maintaining
a nativity scene actively and impermissibly supports the purely re-
ligious nature of the holiday. 159 According to the dissent, the
creche display fit into none of the categories in which the Court
may permit the government to acknowledge religion.160
Although the dissent was not concerned about the Court's
"less than rigorous application of the Lemon test,"1 1 the dissent
was troubled by the historical and philosophical underpinnings of
the majority opinion. The dissent insisted that the history of pub-
162licly celebrating Christmas did not support the Court's opinion,
and that the majority's entire approach suggested a fundamental
misapprehension of the proper role of history in constitutional in-
terpretation."' The dissent distinguished the historical analyses in
Walz and Marsh because the Court there limited its historical in-
quiry to the specific practice under review.1 ' In Lynch, however,
the dissent felt that the Court did not examine closely the specific
history of the public celebration of Christmas, or the public display
of nativity scenes, but only asserted generally that the government
always has acknowledged the role of religion in American life.165
The history of the establishment clause, the dissent maintained,
157. See id. at 1375-78.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Justice Brennan delineated three types of situations in which the state officially
and permissibly may acknowledge religion: (1) if the government acts to accommodate indi-
vidual religious expression, see, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a
"released time" program by which the public schools allowed students to attend religious
centers for instruction during school hours); (2) if the government practice, although once
religious, now exists for purely secular reasons, see, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws); and (3) if the government acts ceremonially in
acknowledging the religious element as part of American culture, such as the national motto
"In God We Trust," Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1380-82.
161. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1370-71. "Although the Court's relaxed application of the
Lemon test... is regrettable, it is at least understandable and properly limited to the
particular facts of this case." Id. at 1380.
162. See id. at 1383-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. See id. at 1382-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1383 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also pointed out that recog-
nition of Christmas as a public holiday did not achieve widespread acceptance until long
after the Framers' day and, therefore, recognition of the holiday had not been as continuous
as the majority contended. Id. at 1385 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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gave no indication of any longstanding public support for allowing
the city to display the creche. The dissent concluded that the
Court improperly upheld the activity by using an historical argu-
ment without relying on any specific historical evidence.""8
IV. ANALYSiS
In Marsh and Lynch the Court moved away from a rigorous
application of the Lemon analysis and toward a standard that the
Court grounded in ambiguous historical references and a blanket
recognition of religion in American society. More importantly, the
Court suggested that the establishment clause protects only
against the establishment of a state church, a much narrower inter-
pretation than the Court adopted in a long line of earlier decisions.
Although Marsh and Lynch arguably are limited in scope167 the
Court's analytical inquiry signals the beginning of a new establish-
ment clause analysis that is out of step with the Court's traditional
approach. This part of the Recent Development criticizes the
Marsh and Lynch opinions on two levels: the Court's historical ap-
proach, and the Court's departure from rigorous application of the
Lemon test.
A. The Historical Approach
One theme that pervades the analysis in Marsh and Lynch is
the Court's opinion that government-funded legislative prayer and
public nativity scenes are benign when compared with the dangers
of eighteenth century state-established churches.6 8 In Marsh the
Court concluded that the practice of legislative prayer has coex-
isted with the first amendment principles of nonestablishment and
religious freedom since the country's earliest years.16 9 The Lynch
Court pointed to numerous instances in which the government has
acknowledged religious holidays and symbols since the 1700s. 170
166. See id. at 1386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 1370 (Brennan, J. dissenting); Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3337 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the Lynch Court reached "an essentially narrow
result which turns largely upon the particular holiday context." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1370.
He also maintained that the Marsh majority opinion was "narrow and, on the whole, care-
ful," adding that the decision should pose little threat to the overall fate of the establish-
ment clause. In Marsh, however, Justice Brennan's dissent may have been tempered by his
concurring comment in School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), that legis-
lative prayer may be constitutional.
168. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365; Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3336-37.
169. Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3335.
170. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360.
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The majority may have wished to demonstrate its "ability and will-
ingness to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow. 1 71 In
earlier opinions, however, the Court repeatedly refused to accept
the argument that government-sponsored religious practices are
constitutional because they represent only "minor encroachments"
on first amendment principles. 172
Approaching establishment of religion questions primarily by
inquiring into the contemporaneous understanding of the first
amendment's guarantees173 necessarily presumes that a historical
survey would best reveal the scope of establishment clause rights
in the twentieth century. This assumption presents two related
problems. First, as Professor Tribe maintains, the historical record
of the Framers' intent in writing the establishment clause is incon-
clusive.17 4 Both the majority and the principal dissent in Marsh
present strong historical arguments over whether the Framers in-
tended the establishment prohibitions to include legislative
prayer.
1 75
The Lynch Court's historical analysis is even less compelling
because publicly sponsored Christmas nativity scenes have a much
shorter history than legislative prayer,
17 6 Sunday closing laws, 177
and church property tax exemptions.17 8 The Lynch Court's ap-
proach certainly does not support an argument that the Framers
intended to exclude public nativity scenes from first amendment
restrictions.Y
A second problem with the Court's historical approach is that
it overlooks national change between the eighteenth and twentieth
171. Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3337 (quoting School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
172. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 n.56 (1973); School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
173. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1358.
174. See L. Tim., supra note 5, at 816; see also Note, supra note 15, at 1477 & nn.93-
97. But see R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HIsTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT
FICTION at xiv (1982). Professor Cord claims that he can prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the historical record demonstrates that the Framers did not intend a wall of separation
between church and state or a strictly neutral interpretation of the first amendment estab-
lishment clause. See id.
175. Compare Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3337 with Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 3347-51 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) and The Supreme Court 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. Rsv. 4, 146 (1983) (Marsh
Court's reliance on historical precedent is ill-founded).
176. Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3330.
177. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
178. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
179. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1383 n.25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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centuries. Today the country is far more diverse religiously than in
the Framers' time. This change may require a new interpretation
of the establishment clause to further the same values that the
Framers first sought to protect.180 The Court suggests in Marsh
and Lynch that it should weigh the establishment dangers of a re-
ligious activity by considering the similarity between the question-
able activity and a government-established church, because the
threat of an official church prompted the Framers to draft the first
amendment.181 Although history may illuminate ultimate constitu-
tional objectives,182 the Court's interpretation in Marsh and Lynch
is too narrow because it does not protect contemporary religious
liberties. The country probably no longer sees state-established re-
ligion as a threat, but many fear subtler forms of favoritism and
encroachment that the Court failed to consider.
Marsh and Lynch are also inconsistent with the broader stan-
dard that the first amendment expressly established. Although the
religion clauses are "opaque," 188 the long standing interpretation of
the establishment prohibition has followed the language of the first
amendment itself: "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion. . . ."I" The Court has held that a law or
government activity that does not support expressly or officially a
certain religion nonetheless may be a law or activity "respecting"
establishment.1 85 Thus, a significant step toward establishment
that violates the principles underlying the establishment clause
should be enough to invoke constitutional protection.1 6
While in the historical analysis section of the Marsh opinion
the Court discussed evidence of the Framers' intent, in Lynch the
Court used a broader historical perspective to emphasize present
180. See id. at 1361; School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240-41 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Giannella, supra
note 16, at 514-15.
181. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365-66; Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3335.
182. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970).
183. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
185. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
771 (1973); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
186. The Court's historical approach laudibly and necessarily defeats an extreme "foot
in the door" argument, which advocates prohibiting even minor encroachments on establish-
ment clause rights because every encroachment is a logical step toward a state church. The
mere absence over a long period of time of significant strides toward establishing an actual
state church, however, does not mean that a given law or government activity does not vio-




official acknowledgments of religion, such as the national holidays
at Thanksgiving and Christmas, the national motto "In God We
Trust," the display of religious paintings in public art galleries,
and the presence of prayer chapels in the Capitol building.187 Rely-
ing on a lengthy discussion of the various religious trappings of
American society as support for a decision on whether a particular
government activity violates the establishment clause represents a
move toward vague, unguided analysis rather than an application
of any lasting constitutional principles. This line of reasoning en-
sures perpetuation, rather than rigorous constitutional evaluation,
of questionable practices simply because no one previously chal-
lenged them. The Court's reasoning threatens to establish as the
predominant analytical stronghold Justice Douglas' comment in
Zorach v. Clauson that "[w]e are a religious people whose institu-
tions presuppose a Supreme Being."'188
B. The Lemon Test
The Supreme Court often has stated that the Lemon criteria
embody the primary concerns underlying the principles that the
establishment clause protects. 8 9 The Court consistently has held
that a statute or government activity must satisfy the Lemon test
to pass muster under the establishment clause. 90 The Court just as
consistently, however, has refused to adopt officially the Lemon
analysis as the only test to evaluate establishment of religion ques-
tions. '1 The flexibility that establishment of religion cases require
to avoid unduly infringing on free exercise rights justifiably may
prevent the Court from adopting the Lemon test as the Court has
adopted sole guidelines in other areas of constitutional law.192 The
187. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360. The dissent distinguished the majority's official
acknowledgement of religion either as permissible gestures toward free exercise or as devoid
of any genuine religious significance. See id. at 1376-80.
188. 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). See The Supreme Court 1982 Term, supra note 175, at
146-47 (the Court no longer should rely on Zorach as useful precedent).
189. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 772 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). But cf. Giannella, supra note
13, at 185 (criticizing the Lemon test because it makes no reference to the neutral role of
government).
190. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 510 (1982).
191. Despite the Lemon test's status as a well-settled principle of constitutional law,
Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983), the Court generally regards the test only as a
"convenient, accurate distillation" of prior evaluations, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358
(1975), a "helpful signpost," Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973), or an "often useful
inquiry," Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
192. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1983); Cen-
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Court's failure to apply the Lemon test rigorously in Lynch and at
all in Marsh, however, suggests that the Court is growing dissatis-
fied with the secular purpose, secular effect, and no excessive en-
tanglement requirements. The Court may perceive the Lemon test
as too restrictive, often requiring an unwarranted intrusion into
other legitimate interests.193 This new trend in establishment
clause jurisprudence significantly weakens the Lemon test as a rig-
orous analytical tool. Under the Court's historical approach, once it
has explored the Framers' intent, or examined the religious charac-
ter of past government behavior, and reasoned that either the his-
torical background or the relatively benign nature of the chal-
lenged activity creates a presumption in favor of permitting the
activity, then the Court no longer feels compelled to rely on the
Lemon test.
In Marsh the Court inexplicably did not even find the Lemon
test relevant, and in Lynch the Court applied the Lemon criteria
extremely narrowly. First, the Lynch Court inquired only whether
the government had any secular purpose for the creche display,
and rejected a test requiring exclusively secular objectives.194 The
Court did not consider whether the government's purpose was pri-
marily secular. The Court may not have wanted to examine too
closely the motivation behind the government's conduct.195 In
other cases, however, the Court has inquired into questions of in-
tent beyond the prima facie assertions,196 and in Lynch evidence
existed of a religious purpose behind the display. 97 The Lynch
tral Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (articulat-
ing a four part analysis for deciding commercial speech cases, a test that the Court later
cited as the definitive inquiry); see also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507
(1981).
193. The Lynch Court, however, did attempt to reaffirm its opposition to the estab-
lishment of religion and its intention to protect the genuine objectives of the establishment
clause. See 104 S. Ct. at 1366.
194. See id. at 1361-62, 1372 & n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195. The Court has been reluctant to attribute unconstitutional motives to a govern-
ment action, particularly when the Court can derive a plausible secular purpose from the
face of the statute. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3066 (1983); see Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); L. Tasn, supra note 5, at 837. But see
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (rejecting the avowed secular purpose of
the activity); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (same).
196. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980); cf. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97, 107-08 & n.16 (1968) (fundamentalist sectarian views were the clear motivation for the
statute).
197. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1373 & n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
cited the district court's finding that the considerable amount of correspondence sent to the
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majority interpreted the Lemon test to require a wholly religious
purpose for striking down a law or activity,198 while the dissent im-
plied that anything less than a wholly secular goal would suffice. 99
A better approach would allow inquiry into government intent
without a strong presumption of secular motives, but also would
require a challenger to show that the predominant purpose of the
activity is not secular.200 In addition, the Court should consider
whether alternative means are available to accomplish valid secular
objectives without infringing on establishment rights.20' Further-
more, the Court should continue to recognize the presence or ab-
sence of a public interest or purpose behind the activity, a central
element in several major establishment decisions.20 2
A second indication that the Lynch Court applied the Lemon
criteria extremely narrowly is that the Court applied the primary
effect test essentially only to compare the benefits to religion in the
Lynch case with the benefits to religion in a long line of other
cases. 203 The Court distinguished Grendel's Den and McCollum,
cases concerning substantial aid to religion,20 4 and then stated that
indirect, remote, or incidental benefits to religion do not satisfy the
primary effect requirement. While examining prior holdings and
articulating a standard are a proper introduction to discussion of
the specific case before the Court, the Lynch Court never ad-
dressed the actual effect of the creche display.20 5 The Court did
mayor of the city generally supported the view that the challenge to the constitutionality of
the creche represented an attack on religious life and an attempt to deny the majority of the
community a means of publicly expressing its beliefs. The district court further found that
"the City has accepted and implemented the view of its predominantly Christian citizens
that it is a 'good thing' to have a creche in a Christmas display, .... because it is a good
thing to 'keep "Christ in Christmas."' " Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1173.
198. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
199. See id. at 1373 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 835-36. Professor Tribe maintains that if something
is arguably nonreligious, it is sufficiently secular to pass the secular purpose test, a relatively
low threshold.
201. See supra note 153.
202. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-47 (1968); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947). Professor Choper believes that a crucial question in estab-
lishment clause analysis is how to determine whether the government's purpose is to further
the general welfare of society or to advance religion. See Choper, supra note 5, at 606.
203. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363-64.
204. See supra notes 54-56 & 62-63 and accompanying text.
205. In other cases, the Court has considered the actual effect of the challenged law or
government activity. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3067-71 (1983); Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 505, 511 (1982); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-94 (1973); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 224 (1963).
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not answer the challengers' contention that display of the creche
clearly and impermissibly places the government's imprimatur of
approval on the symbols and beliefs of a particular religion. The
Court merely made summary comparisons to other establishment
cases and concluded, with little support, that the benefits to reli-
gion in Lynch were indirect, remote, and incidental. The Court
should focus on the specific case presented, without undue reliance
on other cases that presented entirely different facts.
A final indication that the Lynch Court applied the Lemon
test extremely narrowly is that the Court sharply cut back the im-
pact of the entanglement test. Although in Lynch the administra-
tive relations between the city government and the religious com-
munity were de minimis,20 6 the Court suggested that only
comprehensive, enduring administrative surveillance and entangle-
ment would satisfy the administrative strand of the entanglement
test.2 07 The Court also declined to hold that political divisiveness
could serve as an independent ground for invalidating conduct
under the establishment clause. Whether the Court is implying
that the political divisiveness strand of the entanglement analysis
is now a useless inquiry, or that on the facts in Lynch the political
divisiveness issue was not sufficient to override the secular purpose
and effect tests is not clear. If the Court intended to abandon po-
litical divisiveness analysis altogether, then it blatantly repudiated
the vital establishment clause concern of minimizing political dis-
sension and conflict over purely religious issues.20 8
C. Synthesis
The Marsh and Lynch decisions establish an analytical prece-
dent that fails to provide adequate protection against impermissi-
ble government involvement in religious activity. Through these
decisions the Court has diluted the authority of the Lemon test by
allowing the historical or pervasive nature of a particular religious
activity to become the primary focus of establishment clause
analysis.
Marsh and Lynch leave unclear the precise effect of historical
analysis on future establishment clause decisions. First, the Court
206. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
207. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-22 (1971)).
208. The future of the political divisiveness test is unclear. The Lynch Court simply
ratified its earlier statement in Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3071 n.11 (1983), that the
political divisiveness test applies only to direct government subsidies to parochial schools,
parochial school teachers, or other religious institutions. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363.
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may be developing a fourth criterion-the history or pervasive na-
ture of the activity-that it will weigh in conjunction with the
three Lemon criteria. Second, the new analysis may create an im-
plied exemption to the three part Lemon test, wherein historical or
pervasiveness considerations simply override the Lemon criteria.
Last, and most threatening to establishment protections, Marsh
and Lynch may signal that the secular purpose, primary secular
effect, and excessive entanglement criteria no longer carry signifi-
cant weight, and that the Court will decide establishment cases us-
ing a more amorphous standard grounded in uncertain interpreta-
tions of the history and pervasiveness of religion in American life.
The Court should consider the long standing significance of a
religious expression or an activity's contemporaneous existence
with the drafting of the first amendment without decimating the
Lemon test. If the Court wishes to develop further these considera-
tions as independent grounds to uphold a government-sponsored
religious activity, its decisions should address squarely the effect of
this new analysis on the stringent and protective Lemon test. His-
torical analysis, however, should not usurp the Lemon standard. At
most, the Court should balance its historical inquiry against a
strict application of the Lemon criteria or should consider histori-
cal evidence only in the context of each Lemon criterion. Legiti-
mate contemporary concerns about the government's role in reli-
gion, which may differ from historical fears, require that the Court
reaffirm its commitment to the Lemon test as the foundation of
establishment clause analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's two latest establishment clause decisions
mark a significant analytical departure from the three part Lemon
test that the Court applied in a long line of prior cases. Marsh and
Lynch demonstrate the Court's apparent attempt to exclude from
the scope of establishment clause protection minor encroachments
that the Court believes either do not pose the actual dangers which
the Framers feared in the eighteenth century church, or that
merely constitute the government's routine historical recognition
of religion in American society. The Court's continued use of the
new historical approach threatens not only uniformity in establish-
ment clause jurisprudence under the Lemon test, but also the
fundamental first amendment protections that the traditional ap-
proach has secured. First, historical review cannot yield a defini-
tive interpretation of the Framers' intent. Second, historical analy-
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sis does not protect adequately against contemporary
establishment dangers that the first amendment drafters did not or
could not anticipate. Last, the Court's idea of pointing to other,
distinguishable official acknowledgements of religion does not jus-
tify the government's active participation in religious activity. The
Supreme Court should reaffirm its commitment not only to estab-
lishment clause principles, but also to the Lemon test as a rigorous
analytical framework that protects those principles.
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